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Abstract 
A meta-analysis was conducted to examine the extent of continued influence of misinformation 
in the face of correction and the theoretical explanations of this phenomenon.  Aggregation of 
results from 32 studies (N= 6,527) revealed that, on average, correction does not entirely 
eliminate the effect of misinformation (r = -.05, p = .045).  Corrective messages were found to be 
more successful when they are coherent, consistent with the audience’s world-view, and 
delivered by the source of the misinformation itself.  Corrections are less effective if the 
misinformation was attributed to a credible source, the misinformation has been repeated 
multiple times prior to correction, or when there was a time lag between the delivery of the 
misinformation and the correction.  These findings are consistent with predictions based on 
theories of mental models and offer concrete recommendations for practitioners.   
Keywords: Misinformation; correction; continued influence; meta-analysis 
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A Meta-Analytic Examination of The Continued Influence of Misinformation in the Face of 
Correction: How Powerful is it, why does it Happen, and how to Stop it? 
In the contemporary media environment individuals often encounter myths, rumors, 
reporting errors, and misinformation deliberately or inadvertently circulated by the media, 
governments, and other interest groups.  Recent research shows that on social media, false news 
reach more people and spread more rapidly than accurate news (Vosoughi, Roy, & Aral, 2018).  
For example, during the 2016 presidential elections, nearly one in four Americans was exposed 
to a false news story but fact-checking stories reached only a narrow set of media consumers 
(Guess, Nyhan & Reifler, 2018).  This spread of misinformation poses a challenge to traditional 
news. For instance, the CNN Tonight anchor, Don Lemon, expressed his frustration, saying on 
the air: “I spend most of my time trying to debunk falsities and lies” (Lemon, April 2018). 
Although massive efforts are devoted to debunking rumors, correcting of misinformation, 
and fact-checking, scientific evidence of the effectiveness of these measures appears to be 
inconsistent (Walter & Murphy, 2018).  While some studies have found corrective information to 
reduce the effect of falsehoods (e.g., Skurnik, Yoon, & Schwarz, 2005) other studies suggest that 
individuals may struggle to discount misinformation (e.g., Schwarz et al., 2007).  In fact, 
corrective messages can even backfire by increasing support for the discredited position (Nyhan 
& Reifler, 2010).  Multiple theoretical frameworks have been developed in an attempt to account 
for the complexities of such continued effect of misinformation (Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, 
Schwarz, & Cook, 2012).  However, individual studies that examine those theoretical 
propositions are typically designed to test a single explanatory mechanism at a time, whereas in 
reality, multiple psychological processes are likely to operate simultaneously.  Moreover, when 
examined in isolation, individual studies do not permit valid generalizations, as each individual 
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study is limited to a particular set of messages, samples, and measurements (O’Keefe, 2015).      
The present study employs a meta-analytical approach to advance the understanding of 
the scope and mechanisms underlying the continued influence of misinformation in the face of 
correction by aggregating results across multiple studies.  Once the overall effect size is 
determined, a series of moderation analyses test a number of previously proposed explanations to 
the continued effect of misinformation.  Specifically, the study investigates: (a) characteristics of 
misinformation that make the misinformation harder to root out and (b) characteristics that make 
certain forms of correction more or less effective.  By systematically exploring the properties of 
the misinformation and the characteristics of corrective information, the current study advances 
the theoretical understanding of the psychology of managing conflicting information and offers 
practical guidelines for designing more effective correction messages. 
The Continued Influence of Misinformation 
The continued influence of misinformation can be thought of as one of many information 
processing biases commonly exhibited by media consumers.  For instance, it is well documented 
that individuals privilege exemplar-based information over base-rate information, such that 
individuals’ perceptions of an issue can be skewed by unrepresentative exemplars (Allen, Preiss, 
& Gayle, 2006; Zillmann, 2002).  Importantly, whereas the exemplification theory is concerned 
with how individuals manage different types of information (statistics vs. exemplars) that are 
both correct, the current study explores responses to correction or retraction of the same type of 
information such that the status of the initial communication changes from true to false. 
Past meta-analyses examining the effect of correction compared to uncorrected 
misinformation control conditions have found that corrective messages can, indeed, significantly 
reduce belief in misinformation (Blank & Launay, 2014; Walter & Murphy, 2018).  These 
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findings importantly demonstrate that exposure to a correction is better than receiving no 
correction at all. However, this choice of control largely overlooks the role played by 
misinformation.  Recently, Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson and Albarracín (2017) aggregated the 
results of eight reports to reveal a large effect (d = .75-1.06) of misinformation in the face of 
correction.  However, given the limited scope of the study (eight reports published from 1994 to 
2015 and three moderators) and its exploratory nature, there is a need for a more complete and 
theory-driven synthesis of the literature.   
To further advance this field, the current meta-analysis specifically examines randomized 
experiments comparing between attitudes and beliefs of individuals who were exposed to 
corrected misinformation and those who were not exposed to misinformation in the first place.  
This contrast allows to determine the extent to which correction interventions revert the 
individuals’ attitudes and beliefs back to baseline (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Fenton, & Martin, 
2014).   Given that participants are randomly assigned to conditions, they are expected to be 
equivalent in terms of their baseline attitudes and other characteristics. Ideally, if corrective 
messages were fully effective, there would be no significant difference between the beliefs of 
those exposed to the correction following a false message compared to those who were never 
exposed to the misinformation in the first place.  Thus, significant differences between these two 
conditions represent the continued effect of misinformation in spite of the correction.  The first 
aim of the present study is to identify the average continued effect of misinformation: 
RQ1: What is the effect of correction of misinformation compared to a no-
misinformation control? 
Once the average effect size of the continued misinformation influence is identified, 
theoretical mechanisms underlying this effect are explored. 
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Theoretical Explanations of the Continued Influence of Misinformation  
Multiple theories explicate the effect of misinformation in spite of correction.  These are 
by no means competing theories.  Rather they complement each other and at times may overlap.   
Mental models.  According to this approach, individuals construct a mental 
representation of unfolding events but seem reluctant to dismiss key information if an alternative 
explanation was sufficient to fill this void (Ecker, Lewandowky, Swire, & Chang, 2011).  In 
other words, individuals may prefer to uphold a coherent, albeit incorrect mental model than to 
be left with an incomplete one (Johnson & Seifert, 1994).   
Hence, to be effective, a correction should offer information that can successfully replace 
the refuted components of the mental model without compromising the coherence of all the 
existing elements in the story (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  Rather than merely discounting the 
misinformation, a successful correction should provide an alternative explanation, offering 
evidence, and/or explaining why the misinformation was presented in the first place.  For 
instance, in the context of vaccine safety, if people think that health organizations take part in an 
elaborate conspiracy to conceal relevant information from concerned parents, a message from 
health experts negating the vaccination-autism link will do little to reduce belief in 
misinformation.  In fact, such efforts may backfire by making the audiences cling even harder to 
anti-vaccination myths.  A more effective correction would try to substitute the original mental 
model with a coherent explanation that includes information about vaccine safety as well as 
explain the corrupt history of the anti-vaccine movement.  In sum, the richness of detail in the 
original misinformation and the extent to which the correction offers a coherent explanatory 
framework should determine the continued influence effect (Cappella, Maloney, Ophir, & 
Brennan, 2015).  It is hypothesized that: 
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H1a: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger for high compared 
to low-coherence misinformation. 
H1b: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger for low compared to 
high-coherence correction. 
H1c: Misinformation and correction coherence will interact such that the continued 
influence effect will be stronger when misinformation coherence is high but 
correction coherence is low.   
Once a mental model is constructed, it has been speculated that the longer the 
misinformation is held the more it becomes integrated into memory and is then more difficult to 
root out (Ecker, Lewandowsky, Cheung, & Maybery, 2015).  Ostensibly, although even 
immediately retracted information can have a trace effect, real-time corrections are easier to 
integrate into the mental model, potentially minimizing the effect of misinformation.  Indeed, 
educational research consistently finds that immediate correction of an error is superior to a 
delayed correction (Barbetta, et al., 1994).  Thus, the duration of time between exposure to the 
misinformation and the correction could also moderate the effect of misinformation: 
H2: The longer is the time delay between exposure to misinformation and its 
correction, the stronger is the continued influence of misinformation. 
Fluency and familiarity.  Familiarity and fluency serve as important heuristics in 
favoring certain information (Berinsky, 2015).  Fluency refers to the metacognitive experience of 
the relative ease or difficulty of the thought process.  Information can be fluent (i.e., highly 
accessible), or it can be disfluent – hard to understand and retrieved only through an effortful 
process (Schwarz, 2015).  Overall, the literature suggests that the metacognitive experience of 
fluency guides truth judgments, such that fluent information is regarded as more truthful (Reber 
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& Schwarz, 1999).   
In addition to the previously-discussed coherence, several factors can contribute to the 
sense of fluency, including visual elements (making statements appear easy or difficult to read) 
and the repetition of information.  Repetition strengthens the experience of fluency and makes 
information more readily accessible for retrieval, more familiar, and more consequential in 
subsequent attitude formation (e.g., Hansen & Wänke, 2009).  Along with fluency, numerous 
judgment biases such as pluralistic ignorance (Lewandowsky et al., 2012) and perceived social 
consensus (Festinger, 1954) can potentially explain the ability of repetition to solidify belief in 
misinformation.  As demonstrated in the context of eyewitness research, repetition, but not 
number of sources, increase susceptibility to misinformation (Foster, Huthwaite, Yesberg, Garry, 
& Loftus, 2012).  Remarkably, Berinsky (2015) argues that simply asking subjects to repeat a 
rumor to themselves – without any indication that the rumor is true - increases its effect that 
persist for weeks after the initial exposure.  Thus, repetition of the misinformation is likely to 
make it take root further in the message recipients’ minds.  In fact, the correction itself can 
backfire by repeating misinformation. Since familiarity serves as a heuristic, corrective messages 
that repeat the misinformation attempting to quash inaccuracies through direct refutation can 
inadvertently facilitate misinformation fluency and make it even more impactful (Berinsky, 
2015).   
Following the same logic, it is suggested that repetition of the corrective message can 
strengthen its encoding, resulting in perceived familiarity and greater acceptance of the 
correction.  Though only a limited number of studies systematically manipulated repetition of 
corrective information, there is some evidence that repeating a correction can reduce reliance on 
misinformation (Ecker, et al., 2011; Ozturk, Li, & Sakamoto, 2015).  It is hypothesized that: 
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H3a: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger when 
misinformation is repeated. 
H3b: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger when corrective 
messages repeat the misinformation compared to corrective messages that do not 
repeat the misinformation.   
H3c: The continued influence of misinformation will be weaker when corrective 
information is repeated. 
Worldview consistency.  To reconcile preexisting beliefs with a seemingly contradicting 
reality, people are motivated to discount information that challenges their worldview by 
derogating the source of the message or questioning the accuracy of the claims (Kunda, 1990).  
In contrast, information that fits within people’s belief system is often judged as probative and 
accepted at face value even when its validity is called into question by experts and authority 
figures.  Motivated processing of information can result from: (a) an attitude congruency bias or 
(b) a disconfirmation bias.  While the former bias focuses on scenarios where people provide 
more favorable evaluations of messages that support their prior beliefs, the latter deals with 
situations where disconfirming arguments are scrutinized and called into question, irrespective of 
their actual merit (Taber & Lodge, 2006).  In short, both biases suggest that when motivated to 
reach a certain conclusion, people can vary their level of attention and scrutiny of information to 
support their preferences (Chang, 2015). 
Unsurprisingly, when information that is consistent with one’s worldview is retracted, 
individuals are more likely to engage in motivated processing and discount the retraction even in 
the face of concrete evidence and mounting facts (Flynn, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2017).  Thus, it 
seems that the continued influence effect grows stronger when it aligns with partisan goals and, 
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by the same token, corrections are more effective if they affirm people’s worldview.  
Accordingly, it is hypothesized that: 
H4: Counter-attitudinal corrections will lead to a stronger continued influence effect, 
compared with pro-attitudinal corrections1. 
To further tap into the notion of worldview, the current meta-analysis considers the topic 
of the messages as a proxy-variable.  Some studies on the continued influence of misinformation 
use real-life controversies (e.g., vaccination) as a context.  In such cases, study participants are 
likely to have been exposed to the issue in the past and already developed a position.  
Conversely, other studies construct scenarios that individuals will likely have no prior beliefs 
about (e.g., fictitious news about a fire).  Such “constructed” and “real-life” topics should vary in 
the extent to which worldview plays a role in their processing (Lewandowsky et al., 2012).  It is 
hypothesized that: 
H5: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger in real world contexts 
versus constructed contexts. 
Source evaluation.  Over half a century of research reveals that with few exceptions, 
credibility enhances persuasion outcomes (for review see Pornpitakpan, 2004).  In particular, 
when lacking sufficient motivation and expertise, source credibility serves as a useful heuristic, 
guiding acceptance of the persuasive message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Similarly, in the 
misinformation literature, studies have found that messages are more effective when they are 
associated with a high-credibility source compared to a low-credibility source (Guillory & 
Geraci, 2013).  Though it is difficult to determine what lends credibility to a source of 
                                                          
1 No hypotheses concerning counter-attitudinal misinformation and interaction between misinformation and 
correction were posed because of the inherent interdependency between the two.  If the misinformation was attitude-
consistent, the correction is typically counter-attitudinal and vice versa. 
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information (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), there is a general agreement that communicators’ 
credibility has a positive effect on both acceptance of misinformation and its correction (but see 
Cho, Martens, Kim, & Rodrigue, 2011).  Thus, it is hypothesized that: 
H6a: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the 
misinformation is attributed to a high-credibility source (compared to low-
credibility). 
H6b: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the correction is 
attributed to a low-credibility source (compared to high-credibility). 
Another important dimension of the source involves equivalence between the source of 
the misinformation and the source of the correction.  Admitting a mistake is critical for building 
trust (e.g., Rushton, Reina, & Reina, 2007); thus, a corrective message retracting one’s previous 
statement should infuse confidence and acceptance of that message.   Moreover, when a given 
source corrects their own prior communication, the correction would be seen as more trustworthy 
than a correction issued by a different party with possible ulterior motivations.  Based on this 
logic, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requires that corrective advertising will be made by 
the same brand that was responsible for spreading the false information.  For example, Doan’s 
analgesic products (Mazis & Adkinson, 1976) and Warner-Lambert’s Listerine mouthwash 
(Armstrong, Gurol, & Russ, 1979) were tasked to sponsor and deliver campaigns to counteract 
their own past misleading advertising efforts.  It is therefore hypothesized that:  
H7: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the source of the 
correction is different from (rather than equivalent to) the source of misinformation. 
Negativity bias.  Compared to positive information, negative information is more salient 
and is more rapidly recognized. Moreover, negative information is assigned greater weight and it 
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is, therefore, more consequential in decision making and impression formation (for review see 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; 
Rozin, & Royzman, 2001).  Unsurprisingly, then, negativity bias plays a role in transmission of 
information, as individuals are more likely to pass along information about negative events than 
about positive events when recounting a story containing both elements (Bebbington, MacLeod, 
Ellison, & Fay, 2017).  It is conceivable that the appeal of some misconceptions circulated in the 
media stems from its negative valance.  The MMR vaccination-autism myth, conspiracy theories, 
and rumors of a scandal can be more salient, memorable, and compelling than the non-
sensational, valance-neutral truths that attempt to debunk these false claims.  In other words, 
negativity bias might, at least in part, be responsible for the persistent influence of 
misinformation when individuals continue to retain and retrieve refuted information: 
H8a: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the 
misinformation is negative (vs.  positive or neutral). 
H8b: The continued effect of misinformation will be stronger when the correction is 
positive or neutral (vs.  negative). 
Retrieval failure due to negation.  Lewandowsky et al.  (2012) suggest that another 
challenge for discounting misinformation is failure in the processes of encoding and retrieval of 
memories.  Specifically, according to the schema plus tag theory (Clark & Chase, 1972), people 
encode negative memories by creating a positive memory with a negative tag.  In other words, 
when the original misinformation is linguistically negated (e.g., “Jim is not guilty”) the 
information is encoded by adding a negative tag to an existing mental representation of the 
misinformation (Jim guilty – not).  This tag can then be “lost” or fail to be subsequently 
retrieved.  Thus, merely thinking of negation statements (“X is not Y”) creates false memories of 
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the negated object (Fiedler et al.  1996).  To avoid this, affirming language (e.g., “John is 
innocent”) should be used in lieu of negating language (Mayo et al., 2014).  In fact, the 
deleterious influence of correcting by negating, prompted a succinct recommendation to “avoid 
negations” (Nyhan & Reifler, 2012, p.  1).  Following this line of reasoning, it is hypothesized 
that:  
H9: The continued influence of misinformation will be stronger when the correction 
message involves linguistic negation compared to affirmative language. 
Method 
Sampling 
Literature search.  Studies were located through a search in electronic databases (e.g., 
Google Scholar, JSTOR, PsychINFO, ProQuest, Communication and Mass Media Complete), 
using the search terms: debunking, misinformation, correction, “continued influence”, and their 
derivations.  Then, the reference lists of these publications were examined to identify any 
prospective studies that were not obtained through the database search.  Finally, 12 experts from 
the fields of communication, political science, cognitive and social psychology were contacted in 
order to solicit unpublished data and identify omissions in our sample.   
Inclusion criteria.  The goal of the present study was to identify the extent to which 
corrections can revert participants’ state back to baseline.  Thus, to be included in the sample, a 
study had to report on a comparison between a misinformation and correction condition and a 
no-misinformation control group.  Studies that focused on correction of misinformation without 
including a no misinformation condition were excluded (e.g., Johnson & Seifert, 1994).  
Moreover, the meta-analysis examined processing conflicting information, such that information 
is first presented as true but is subsequently revoked or challenged.  Hence, the sample does not 
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include studies in which the misinformation is only presented in the context of negation of this 
information (e.g., false information is accompanied with the label “myth”, Skurnik, et al., 2005).  
Also excluded are studies in which misinformation is presented following a forewarning without 
a post-misinformation correction (e.g., Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang, 2010).  Finally, only 
studies that reported quantitative outcomes using appropriate statistics for calculating an effect 
size were included in the analyses.  When such information was not directly available in the 
research report, corresponding authors were contacted and the missing information was obtained 
(Figure 1 illustrates a flow diagram showing the study screening process). 
--- Figure 1 --- 
Sample.  The final sample included 32 individual studies from 21 research reports (3, 
14.3% unpublished), with a total sample size of 6,527 (M = 203.97, Med = 107, SD = 221.05). 
The most common topic of misinformation among the studies that met the inclusion criteria was 
politics (k = 11), followed by health/science (k = 8), crime/accidents (k = 7), and other (k = 6).   
Coding.  The articles were coded by two coders with a 20% overlap to ensure continued 
reliability.  Krippendorff’s alpha for all variables was satisfactory (range: .71 – 1.0).  The 
relatively low reliability resulted from judgments made by coders examining the original 
research stimuli, such as establishing the credibility of the information or whether the 
information carries positive or negative valance. 
Moderators 
Coherence of misinformation and correction.  The stimuli employed by the researchers 
of the original studies have been obtained and coded for coherence.  Coherence was coded as a 
binary (high/low) variable based on the amount of detail and context provided in the message.  
For corrective information to be coded as high in coherence, the message had to mention a 
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reason for the distribution of the misinformation or provide an alternative explanation, rather 
than merely retract the misinformation.  Overall, nine effect sizes were associated with high-
coherence of misinformation and 13 were coded as low-coherence of misinformation.  Further, 
14 effect sizes were recorded for high-coherence corrections and 17 effect sizes were recorded 
for low-coherence corrections. 
Time delay.  Time delay between misinformation and correction.  Each study was coded 
as either presenting the correction immediately following the misinformation (k = 17) or after a 
filler task (k = 10).  In five studies, corrections were presented both immediately after the 
misinformation and after a filler task. 
Repetition of misinformation and correction.  The number of separate instances in 
which misinformation has been repeated prior to correction was coded as a continuous variable.  
Though the vast majority of effect sizes were associated with a single exposure to 
misinformation, there were some cases where misinformation was repeated twice (k = 6) and 
even three times (k = 2).   Similarly, the number of time the corrective message has been 
presented was coded, resulting in 29 effect sizes for a single exposure and three cases in which 
corrections were presented three times. 
Repetition of misinformation in correction.  Each corrective message was coded as 
either reiterating the misinformation (k = 13) or only providing the correct information without 
restating the false information (k = 11). 
Consistency with worldview.  This variable was coded only for studies that manipulated 
consistency between the participants’ worldview and the valance of the correction.  For example, 
if a correction message about a Democrat candidate (e.g., she resigned not due to the previously 
published allegations of corruption but rather to spend more time with her family) was presented 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  15 
 
to a sample of self-identified Democrats.  In total, the sample of studies included six studies with 
pro-attitudinal corrections and seven studies with counter-attitudinal corrections. 
Context.  The context of the misinformation was coded as either real-world situations 
(e.g., pertaining to actual events such as the war in Iraq) (k = 14) or fictional events (e.g., a 
fictitious news story about a rubbery) (k = 18).   
Source credibility.  The source of the misinformation was coded as either having high 
credibility (k = 7) or low credibility (k = 21) based on the implied expertise and trustworthiness 
of the source.  Similarly, the source of the corrective message was coded as either having high (k 
= 15) or low credibility (k = 15). 
Source equivalence.  For each study it was determined whether the same source 
provided both the misinformation and correction (k = 22) or whether these two types of 
information were attributed to two different sources (k = 12). 
Negativity of misinformation and correction.  The valance of the of the misinformation 
and the correction was determined based on whether the situation is negative (or neutral/positive) 
assuming the information is correct.  Specifically, in 19 cases misinformation was coded as 
negative and in 13 cases misinformation was coded as natural or positive.  In addition, six studies 
were associated with exposure to negatively valanced corrections and 25 studies exposed 
participants to positively valanced or neutral corrections.   
Linguistic negation.  Based on inspection of the stimuli used in the original studies, each 
correction message was coded for whether it used negation (repeating the misinformation with a 
negation tag “no”) (k = 13) or used affirmative language (k = 9). Please see Table 1 for a 
complete list of coded studies and moderators.   
--- Table 1 --- 
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Analysis 
 Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (v.3; Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2005) 
was used to analyze the data, with weights being assigned to primary studies based on the 
inverse of the variance, as opposed to alternative approaches that assign weights based on sample 
size.   The results focus on random-effects models, allowing to generalize the findings beyond 
the specific populations from which the data was drawn (Hedges & Vevea, 1998).  For ease of 
interpretation, we used a correlation coefficient r as the effect size estimate.  This coefficient 
represents the effect of exposure to misinformation that is later corrected compared with a no-
exposure condition.  A negative r indicates stronger continued influence effect, a null effect 
indicates that the corrective message was able to erase the influence of misinformation, and a 
positive r suggests that exposure to the corrective message not merely erased the influence of 
misinformation but also affected participants’ beliefs in a direction consistent with the 
correction.   
After analyzing the average effect of continued influence, the analysis focused on the Q 
statistic to assess the heterogeneity among effect sizes (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & 
Rothstein, 2005), defined as: 
𝑄𝑄 = �𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 (𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑀𝑀)2
𝑘𝑘
𝑖𝑖 = 1
 
Where Wi is the study weight (1/Vi), Yi, is the study effect size, M is the summary effect, 
and k is the number of studies. Thus, the Q statistic computes the deviation of each subgroup 
from the mean weighted by the inverse-variance to yield the weighted sum of squares (WSS), or 
Q.  Given significant heterogeneity, the potential role played by categorical moderators (i.e., 
coherence, worldview, context, credibility, equivalence, negativity, and linguistic negation) was 
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further probed with Q statistic and the continues moderator (i.e., repetition) was tested with a 
meta-regression (Rosenthal, 1991).   
Results 
Across 32 individual studies, the average continued influence effect on beliefs was weak, 
negative, and significant (r = -.05, CI [-.10, -.01], p = .045).  This suggests that, even after 
exposure to corrections, some weak traces of misinformation continue to influence people’s 
beliefs.  Further, significant heterogeneity was observed among effect sizes Q (31) = 156.52, p = 
.0005, I2 = 80.19), indicating variability that might be explained by moderators (Pearce & Field, 
2015). 
Contrary to H1a, there was no significant difference in effect sizes between high (r = -
.08, CI [-.18, .01], p = .09) and low-coherence (r = -.03, CI [-.11, .06], p = .54) misinformation; 
(Q(1) = 0.79, p = .37).  Though-coherence of the misinformation was a nonsignificant moderator, 
coherence of the correction emerged as a significant predictor of effect sizes; Q(1) = 4.46, p = 
.027, with high-coherence corrections resulting in weaker and nonsignificant continued influence 
effects (r = -.03, CI [-.12, .06], p = .37), compared with corrections low in coherence (r = -.12, 
CI [-.19, -.03], p = .004).  Further, the interaction between the coherence of the misinformation 
and the coherence of the correction was tested by creating four groups that included all possible 
combinations of the coherence moderator (corresponding to high-coherence misinformation + 
high-coherence correction, high-coherence misinformation + low-coherence correction, low-
coherence misinformation + high-coherence correction, and low-coherence misinformation + 
low-coherence correction). As Figure 2 illustrates, there was a borderline significant difference 
between the resulting subgroups (Q(3) = 2.97, p = .07), with the strongest impact of 
misinformation occurring when high-coherence misinformation was corrected with low-
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coherence correction (r = -.19, CI [-.34, -.04], p = .04).    
--- Figure 2 --- 
A significant effect of time delay between exposure to misinformation and its correction 
was found (Q(1) = 4.79, p = .045).  The continued effect of misinformation was stronger when 
the correction was presented after a filler task (r = -.13, CI [-.28, -.02], p = .045) compared to 
misinformation that was corrected immediately (r =.01, CI [-.05, .06], p = .87). Further, a meta-
regression was used to test the role played by repetition of misinformation and its correction.  In 
particular, the analysis indicated that repetition of misinformation is a significant predictor of the 
continued influence effect (b = -.30, SE = .12, p = .001), with each additional repetition of 
misinformation enhancing its continued influence on beliefs by an average of .30 points.  Though 
the moderation pattern was in the expected direction, there was no significant difference (Q(1) = 
.1.79, p = .18) between studies that repeated the misinformation within the correction (r = -.10, 
CI [-.19, -.01], p = .03) and studies that used corrective messages without restating the 
misinformation (r = -.02, CI [-.09, .05], p = .52).   Regretfully, given the lack of variance in our 
sample, we were not able to test the role played by repetition of corrective information.    
As predicted, counter-attitudinal corrections led to stronger continued influence effects (r 
= -.20, CI [-.32, -.07], p = .002), compared with pro-attitudinal corrections that tended to yield 
nonsignificant effects (r = -.01, CI [-.15, .15], p = .72); Q(1) = 4.78, p = .018. Additionally, there 
was no significant difference between real world contexts (r = -.02, CI [-.09, .05], p = .50) and 
constructed, or fictional (r = -.04, CI [-.13, .04], p = .32), contexts; Q(1) = 0.12, p = .73.  The 
same results were obtained when discrete study topics were considered rather than comparing 
real world and fictional contexts overall. No significant difference emerged in effects sizes by 
the topic of misinformation in the study;  Q(2) = 0.13, p = .93; politics (r = -.04, CI [-.09, .01], p 
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= .15), health/science (r = -.02, CI [-.13, .08], p = .68), and crime/accidents (r = -.07, CI [-.30, 
.18], p = .61). 
With respect to source credibility, the continued influence effect was stronger (Q(1) = 
4.54, p = .033) when misinformation was attributed to a high credibility source (r = -.18, CI [-
.33, -.02], p = .03) compared to a low credibility source (r = .01, CI [-.05, .06], p = .76).  Yet, the 
credibility of the source delivering the correction was less important, as there was no significant 
difference (Q(1) = 3.12, p = .077) between high credibility sources (r = -.09, CI [-.16, -.02], p = 
.02) and low credibility sources (r = .02, CI [-.08, .11], p = .70).  Additionally, there was a 
significant difference between effect sizes of studies where the source of the misinformation was 
the same as the source of the correction, as opposed to cases where the source of misinformation 
was different from the source of correction (Q(1) = 3.74, p = .05).  As hypothesized, the 
continued influence effect was weaker when the same source delivered both the correction and 
the misinformation (r = .01, CI [-.06, .08], p = .74) and stronger effects were observed when 
different sources were responsible for misinformation and its correction (r = -.10, CI [-.18, -.01], 
p = .02). 
Further, there was no significant difference in the continued influence effect (Q(1) = 0.04, 
p = .85) between negatively valanced misinformation (r = -.04, CI [-.11 .03], p = .25) and neutral 
or positive misinformation (r = -.06, CI [-.15, .04], p = .26).  Similarly, there was no significant 
difference between the impact of misinformation (Q(1) = 0.99, p = .32) when participants were 
exposed to negatively valanced (r = .01, CI [-.12 .14], p = .87) corrections and neutral or positive 
corrections (r = -.06, CI [-.12, -.001], p = .05).  Finally, in contrast with our expectation, the 
continued influence of misinformation did not differ (Q(1) = 0.90, p = .34) by whether the 
correction message involved linguistic negation (r = -.08, CI [-.12 .01], p = .04) or affirmative 
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language (r = -.08, CI [-.16, .05], p = .47).      
Publication bias 
  In order to examine a possible “file drawer” problem, a fail-safe N was calculated 
(Rosenthal, 1991). According to the results, it would require 73 missing studies with an effect 
size of 0 to render the average effect size of continuous influence nonsignificant. To this end, 
though the results are not directly compromised by unpublished research, it can also be argued 
that the continued influence effect is far from being pervasive and robust.   
Discussion 
The current meta-analysis synthesizes four decades of research on continued influence of 
misinformation.  Overall, correction of misinformation does not entirely revert people’s attitudes 
and beliefs to their baseline levels.  Rather, misinformation continues to have a small, albeit 
significant, effect.  The meta-analysis considered six complementary theoretical explanations of 
this effect, examining features of the misinformation and its correction.  A summary of these 
findings appears in Table 2.  Data suggest that repetition of the misinformation, coherence of 
misinformation coupled with a low-coherence correction, and credibility of the misinformation 
result in the greatest continued misinformation effect.  Conversely, this effect is diminished 
when correction is delivered immediately, when it is consistent with the message recipient’s 
worldview, and it is attributed to the same source that was responsible for the misinformation.  
Together, these results provide at least partial support to explanations relying on theories of 
mental models, fluency, world-view consistent elaboration and source evaluation.  No support 
was found for the negativity bias and retrieval failure according to the schema plus tag theory.   
--- Table 2 --- 
Considering the pattern of results (see Table 2), mental models appears to be the most 
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consistently supported explanation.  Curiously, it also seems that the encoding of misinformation 
rather than the correction plays a more major role: the repetition of misinformation creates 
fluency (but not debunking efforts), and the credibility of the source of the misinformation (but 
not the correction) matters.  While reading the misinformation, individuals construct an event 
model, namely a mental representation of a specific situation.  During the reading process, as the 
narrative evolves, individuals continuously update the model (Zawaan, Langston, Graesser, 
1995).  Thus, when the correction appears alongside the misinformation (e.g., a balanced news 
story containing both sides of the argument – the misinformation and the rebuttal) readers are 
able to encode the corrective information and incorporate it in the mental model displacing the 
misinformation.  However, when the information is not corrected immediately, the episodic 
model generated while reading the misinformation is already integrated into the schematic 
representation of the issue.  As noted in past research, “the initial integration of information 
when the model is being built is more readily performed than is its updating after a retraction” 
(Ozturk, Li, & Sakamoto, 2015, p.  2407).   
The significant findings concerning world view-consistency can also be interpreted in 
light of theories of mental representation.  Political ideology constitutes a cognitive schema 
whose epistemological function includes explaining phenomena and making predictions (Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009).  In general, schemas guide attention to information, help organize 
and store it, fill-in gaps, and assist in problem solving (Busselle, 2017).  Like other types of 
schema, political ideology guides individuals’ attention to information.  Thus, with counter-
attitudinal misinformation, the message recipient is motivated to attend to a worldview-
consistent correction that will reduce the cognitive dissonance caused by the misinformation.  
Once the individual attends to the world-view consistent corrective information, ideology can be 
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used as a schema to fill-in the missing information.  For example, consider a situation in which 
the correction is low in coherence but is worldview-consistent.  In other words, it negates the 
misinformation without providing an alternative explanation, but it is consistent with the 
message recipient’s beliefs.  The message recipient then will be motivated to generate a 
worldview-driven explanation.  It is, therefore, plausible that worldview-consistency increases 
tolerance for low-coherence correction, since the gaps in the mental model can be supplemented 
by the overarching schema.   
Whereas multiple findings in the meta-analysis are consistent with predictions derived 
from theories of mental models, no support was found for negativity bias and linguistic negation.  
Negation language and the valance of the misinformation/ correction did not seem to moderate 
the persistence of misinformation.  However, no studies in the sample specifically manipulated 
these effects.  Future research will be well served to examine negativity bias and negation more 
systematically by manipulating these variables within the study design.   
Limitations  
Though meta-analyses offer a bird’s view of the literature that cannot be attained by 
individual studies, they are also limited to the pool of available studies.  Consequently, some 
potential moderators and relevant outcomes were not analyzed due to insufficient number of 
cases.  For example, there is a need for additional research on repetitions of correction messages 
as only few studies manipulated this variable in a systematic way. Moreover, the meta-analysis 
exclusively focused on beliefs as an outcome because of the limited number of studies reporting 
other types of outcomes.   It is not implausible that the continued influence of misinformation 
has different effects on recall, knowledge, or behavior, as it has on beliefs.  Arguably, these 
outcomes represent different stages within the process of persuasion (or debiasing) (McGuire, 
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1968) and they can be affected in different ways.   
Finally, the current meta-analysis was limited to randomized experiments which 
inherently suggests a tradeoff between internal and external validity.  Although the current 
study’s approach offers a stronger theoretical understanding of how misinformation effects can 
persist, it is important to be cautious when generalizing these findings to real-world settings.  
Specifically, randomized experiments ensure equivalence between study participants who are 
exposed to the misinformation and correction and those who were exposed to neither.  However, 
outside the artificially controlled experimental environment, individuals who are exposed to 
misinformation are likely to differ on various background characteristics from those who were 
not exposed to the misinformation at all (e.g., due to processes of selective exposure individuals 
are inclined to seek out attitude-confirming information).  Hence, while the current study 
asserted that correction of misinformation has the potential to bring one’s attitude to the same 
level as that of individuals who were never exposed to the misinformation in the first place, the 
effects uncovered in this meta-analysis represent a best-case scenario.  
Practical Implications 
The results of the meta-analysis can be used to prescribe specific recommendations for 
more effective misinformation correction efforts.   
Credibility attack.  Corrections should criticize the credibility of the source of the 
misinformation.  This serves two functions.  First, source credibility is central to processing of 
the initial (mis)information but not for the correction source.  Thus, trying to undo the damage 
done by climate change deniers and vaccine skeptics with messages that rely, primarily, on the 
expertise of their sources is likely to be futile.  Instead, the correction should focus on 
discrediting the sources of misinformation.  For example, rather than emphasizing the knowledge 
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of a climate science expert, messages should highlight the lack of expertise and relevant training 
of climate change skeptics.  Second, questioning the credibility of the misinformation source can 
enhance the coherence of the corrective message.  Put differently, discrediting the source as 
biased and lacking good will can offer an explanation for the spread of the misinformation and 
make it easier for message consumers to maintain a coherent mental model that dismisses the 
misinformation. 
Same-source correction.  Corrections coming from the same source as the 
misinformation carry more weight than messages delivered by different sources.  This finding 
endorses the FTC mandate for corrective information to be attributed to the same source as the 
original misinformation.  By extension, corrective campaigns can choose spokespersons who are 
members from the same social group as the source of misinformation.  For instance, to 
effectively discredit an anti-vaccination campaign led by parents of children with autism, it may 
be helpful to feature parents of children with autism who support vaccines. 
World-view consistency.  Corrections work better when they fit into people’s world-
view and when misinformation runs counter to preexisting beliefs.  Thus, designers of corrective 
messages should strive to emphasize how the accurate information fits with people’s broader 
belief system.  This approach can be extremely challenging, especially when dealing with value-
laden beliefs (e.g., political ideology); however, in some cases, it is likely to work.  For instance, 
consumers often fear genetically modified organisms (GMOs) because, supposedly, “big food” 
companies are trying to take advantage of unsuspecting individuals.  Specifically, fear of GMOs 
is rooted in false notions that moving genes between species is unnatural and risky; yet, these 
erroneous beliefs might sound very convincing because they align with people’s general fears 
about health and science (Pew Research Center, 2016).  A more promising dialogue with GMOs 
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skeptics would emphasize its positive impact on farmers and the economy, rather than focusing, 
almost exclusively, on the technology and science behind it (Ben-Shahar, 2017).   
Contextualization and explanation.  Finally, corrective messages need to provide not 
only a negation of the misinformation but also explanations that have both internal (i.e., 
compelling and consistent account) and external (i.e., fits the general understanding of how the 
world operates) coherence.  This is especially critical when the initial misinformation provides a 
complete and clear account.  For example, instead of emphasizing agreement among scientists, a 
much more compelling story about the root of climate science denial can recount how oil 
companies sponsor political lobbyists to protect their profits and limit future liabilities.  This is a 
simple story that fits within laypeople’s preexisting understanding of the problematic 
relationship between politicians and interest groups.   
In sum, the results of the study paint an optimistic outlook on the effectiveness of 
correction.  Although there is an undeniable effect of misinformation in the face of correction, it 
is far from being the robust and irreversible phenomenon it is often believed to be.  Therefore, 
researchers and practitioners can utilize various message design characteristics to avert or, at 
least, minimize the threat of misinformation.  It is our hope that this meta-analysis will contribute 
to the existing body of knowledge and prove useful in correcting misinformation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  26 
 
References  
*References for studies included in the meta-analysis are provided in Appendix A. 
Allen, M., Preiss, R. W., & Gayle, B. M. (2006). Meta-analytic examination of the base-rate 
fallacy. Communication Research Reports, 23, 45-51. doi:10.1080/17464090500535863 
Armstrong, G.M., Gurol, M., Russ, F.A. (1979). Detecting and correcting deceptive advertising. 
Journal of Consumer Research, 6, 237–246. doi:10.1086/208765 
Barbetta, P.M., Heward, W. L., Bradley, D. M., & Miller, A. D. (1994). Effects of immediate 
and delayed error correction on the acquisition and maintenance of sight words by 
students with developmental disabilities. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 27, 177-
178. doi:10.1901/jaba.1994.27-177 
Baumeister, R.F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than 
good. Review of General Psychology, 5, 323-370. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.5.4.323 
Bebbington, K., MacLeod, C., Ellison, T. M., & Fay, N. (2017). The sky is falling: Evidence of a 
negativity bias in the social transmission of information. Evolution and Human Behavior, 
38, 92-101. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.07.004 
Ben-Shahar, O. (2017). Consumers fear GMOs because ‘Big Food’ companies bombard them 
with misinformation. Genetic Literacy Project. Retrieved from: 
https://geneticliteracyproject.org/2017/12/18/viewpoint-consumers-fear-gmos-big-food-
companies-bombard-misinformation/ 
Berinsky, A. J. (2017). Rumors and health care reform: Experiments in political misinformation. 
British Journal of Political Science, 47, 241-262. doi:10.1017/S0007123415000186 
Blank, H., & Launay, C. (2014). How to protect eyewitness memory against the misinformation 
effect: A meta-analysis of post-warning studies. Journal of Applied Research in Memory 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  27 
 
and Cognition, 3, 77-88. doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2014.03.005 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L., Higgins, J., & Rothstein, H. (2005). Comprehensive meta-analysis: 
A computer program for meta-analysis [Computer software]. Englewood, NJ: Biostat Inc. 
Busselle, R. (2017). Schema theory and mental models. In: P. Rossler (Ed.), The International 
Encyclopedia of Media Effects, (pp. 1753-1760) Wiley Blackwell. 
Cappella, J. N., Maloney, E., Ophir, Y., & Brennan, E. (2015). Interventions to correct 
misinformation about tobacco products. Tobacco regulatory science, 1, 186-197. 
doi:10.18001/TRS.1.2.8 
Chan, M. P. S., Jones, C. R., Hall Jamieson, K., & Albarracín, D. (2017). Debunking: A meta-
analysis of the psychological efficacy of messages countering misinformation. 
Psychological Science, 28, 1531–1546. doi:10.1177/0956797617714579 
Cho, C. H., Martens, M. L., Kim, H., & Rodrigue, M. (2011). Astroturfing global warming: It 
isn’t always greener on the other side of the fence. Journal of Business Ethics, 104, 571-
587. doi:10.1007/s10551-011-0950-6 
Clark, H. H., & Chase, W. G. (1972). On the process of comparing sentences against pictures. 
Cognitive psychology, 3, 472-517. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(72)90019-9 
Duval, S., & Tweedie, R. (2000). Trim and fill: A simple funnel-plot-based method of testing and 
adjusting for publication bias in meta‐analysis. Biometrics, 56, 455-463. 
doi:10.1111/j.0006-341X.2000.00455.x 
Ecker, U. K., Lewandowsky, S., Cheung, C. S., & Maybery, M. T. (2015). He did it! She did it! 
No, she did not! Multiple causal explanations and the continued influence of 
misinformation. Journal of Memory and Language, 85, 101-115. 
Ecker, U. K., Lewandowsky, S., Swire, B., & Chang, D. (2011). Correcting false information in 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  28 
 
memory: Manipulating the strength of misinformation encoding and its retraction. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 18, 570-578. doi:10.3758/s13423-011-0065-1 
Egger, M., Smith, G. D., Schneider, M., & Minder, C. (1997). Bias in meta-analysis detected by 
a simple, graphical test. BMJ, 315, 629-634. doi:10.1136/bmj.315.7109.629 
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human relations, 7 117-140. 
doi:10.1177/001872675400700202 
Fiedler, K., Walther, E., Armbruster, T., Fay, D., & Naumann, U. (1996). Do you really know 
what you have seen? Intrusion errors and presuppositions effects on constructive 
memory. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 32, 484–511. 
doi:10.1006/jesp.1996.0022 
Flynn, D. J., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2017). The nature and origins of misperceptions: 
Understanding false and unsupported beliefs about politics. Political Psychology, 38, 
127-150. doi:10.1111/pops.12394 
Foster, J. L., Huthwaite, T., Yesberg, J. A., Garry, M., & Loftus, E. F. (2012). Repetition, not 
number of sources, increases both susceptibility to misinformation and confidence in the 
accuracy of eyewitnesses. Acta Psychologica, 139, 320-326. 
doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2011.12.004 
Guess, A., Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2018). Selective Exposure to Misinformation: Evidence 
from the consumption of fake news during the 2016 US presidential campaign. European 
Research Council. 
Guillory, J. J., & Geraci, L. (2013). Correcting erroneous inferences in memory: The role of 
source credibility. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2, 201-209. 
doi:10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.10.001 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  29 
 
Gwaltney, C. J., Metrik, J., Kahler, C. W., & Shiffman, S. (2009). Self-efficacy and smoking 
cessation: A meta-analysis. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors, 23, 56-66. 
doi:10.1037/a0013529 
Hansen, J., & Wänke, M. (2009). Liking what's familiar: The importance of unconscious familiarity 
in the mere-exposure effect. Social Cognition, 27, 161-182. doi:10.1521/soco.2009.27.2.161 
Hedges, L. V., & Vevea, J. L. (1998). Fixed-and random-effects models in meta-analysis. 
Psychological Methods, 3, 486-504. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.3.4.486 
Ito, T. A., Larsen, J. T., Smith, N. K., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1998). Negative information weighs 
more heavily on the brain: The negativity bias in evaluative categorizations. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 887-900. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.887 
Johnson, H. M., & Seifert, C. M. (1994). Sources of the continued influence effect Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20, 1420-1436. 
doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.6.1420 
Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions, 
and elective affinities. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 307-337. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.60.110707.163600 
Lemon, D. (2018, April 12). CNN Tonight. CNN. Retrieved from: https://www.alternet.org/cnns-
don-lemon-shuts-down-ex-trump-aide-live-air 
Lewandowsky, S., Ecker, U. K. H., Seifert, C. M., Schwarz, N., & Cook, J. (2012). 
Misinformation and its correction: Continued influence and successful debiasing. 
Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 13, 106–131. doi:10.1177/1529100612451018 
Mayo, R., Schul, Y., & Burnstein, E. (2004). “I am not guilty” vs “I am innocent”: Successful 
negation may depend on the schema used for its encoding. Journal of Experimental 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  30 
 
Social Psychology, 40, 433-449. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2003.07.008 
Mazis, M. B., & Adkinson, J. E. (1976). An experimental evaluation of a proposed corrective 
advertising remedy. Journal of Marketing Research, 13, 178–183. doi:10.2307/3150855 
McGuire, W. J. (1968). Personality and attitude change: An information processing theory. In A. 
G. Greenwald, T. C. Brock, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Psychological foundations of attitudes 
(pp. 171-196). New York, NY: Academic Press.  
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2012). Misinformation and corrections: Research findings from social 
science. Unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH.  
Nyhan, B., & Reifler, J. (2015). Displacing misinformation about events: An experimental test of 
causal corrections. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 2, 81–93. 
doi:10.1017/XPS.2014.22 
Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., & Ubel, P. A. (2013). The hazards of correcting myths about health care 
reform. Medical Care, 51, 127-132. doi:10.1097/MLR.0b013e318279486b 
O’Keefe, D. J. (2015). Message generalizations that support evidence-based persuasive message 
design: Specifying the evidentiary requirements. Health Communication, 30, 106–113. 
doi:10.1080/10410236.2014.974123  
Ozturk, P., Li, H., & Sakamoto, Y. (2015, January). Combating rumor spread on social media: 
The effectiveness of refutation and warning. In System Sciences (HICSS), 2015 48th 
Hawaii International Conference on (pp. 2406-2414). 
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion (pp. 1-24). NY: Springer. 
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Effects of perceptual fluency on judgments of truth. 
Consciousness and Cognition, 8, 338-342. doi:10.1006/ccog.1999.0386 
Rosenthal, R. (1991). Meta-analytic procedures for social research (2nd ed.). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.  
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  31 
 
Rozin, P., & Royzman, E. B. (2001). Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 296-320. doi:10.1207/S15327957PSPR0504_2  
Schwarz, N., Sanna, L. J., Skurnik, I., & Yoon, C. (2007). Metacognitive experiences and the 
intricacies of setting people straight. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 39, 
127-161. doi:10.1016/S0065-2601(06)39003-X 
Schwarz, N. (2015). Metacognition. In M. Mikulincer, P. R. Shaver, E. Borgida, & J. A. Bargh 
(Eds.), APA handbook of personality and social psychology: Attitudes and social 
cognition (pp. 203–229). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
Skurnik, I., Yoon, C., & Schwarz, N. (2007). “Myths & Facts” about the flu: Health education 
campaigns can reduce vaccination intentions. Unpublished manuscript. 
Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., & Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. Science, 359, 
1146-1151. doi:10.1126/science.aap9559 
Walter, N., & Murphy, S. T. (2018). How to unring the bell: A meta-analytic approach to 
correction of misinformation. Communication Monographs, advance online publication 
doi:10.1080/03637751.2018.1467564 
Zillmann, D. (2000). Exemplification theory of media influence. In J. Bryant, D. Zillmann, J. 
Bryant, M. B. Oliver (Eds.), Media effects (pp. 19-42), Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 
Mahwah, NJ. 
 Zwaan, R. A., Langston, M. C., & Graesser, A. C. (1995). The construction of situation models 
in narrative comprehension: An event-indexing model. Psychological science, 6, 292-
297. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1995.tb00513.x 
 
 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  32 
 
Table 1.  Studies included in Meta-Analysis 
Study Year Study  N Topic 
Aikin et al.cg 2015 1 504 Misleading direct-to-consumer drug ads 
Armstrong et al.bcegh 1979 1 102 Deceptive ads for Listerine mouthwash 
Berinskybdefh 2015 1 556 Rumors about healthcare reform 
Cobb, Nyhan, & Reiflerc 2013 1 168 Misleading information about a politician 
Dixon et al.bfh 2015 1 371 False information about the autism-vaccine link 
Ecker et al.abdhij 2014 1 96 Fictitious report about a liquor store robbery 
Ecker et al.abefh 2011 1 115 Fictitious news report about a warehouse fire 
Greitemeyer et al.cf 2015 1 124 Scientific retraction  
Greitemeyer et al.cf 2015 2 180 Scientific retraction  
Greitemeyerg 2014 1 106 Scientific retraction 
Huangdefh 2017 1 252 Various rumors 
Huangbefh 2017 2 248 Various rumors 
Mazis & Adkinsonbcg 1976 1 54 Deceptive ads for a mouthwash brand 
Misraabce 1992 1 108 Deceptive information regarding ability  
Misraabcef 1992 2 51 Rumors about McDonald’s use of worm meat 
Misraabce 1992 3 48 Misleading information regarding supermarkets  
Nyhan & Reiflerbdefh 2015 1 750 Rumors about political misconduct 
Rapp & Kendeouce 2007 1 48 Refuted story 
Rich & Zaragozaabcdf 2016 1 111 Deceptive information regarding a jewelry theft  
Rich & Zaragozaabcdef 2016 2 99 Deceptive information regarding a jewelry theft 
Sawyer & Semenikgl 1978 1 142 Deceptive ads for Listerine mouthwash 
Thorsoncfhlij 2013 3a 87 Misleading information about misconduct 
Thorsoncfhlij 2013 3b 92 Misleading information about health care policy 
Thorsoncfhlij 2013 3c 81 Misleading information about misconduct  
Thorsoncdefj 2016 1 96 Misleading information about misconduct 
Thorsonbcdfhij 2016 2 316 Misleading information about misconduct 
Thorsoncfhij 2016 3 307 Misleading information about misconduct 
Woodbdegl 2014 3 1012 Misinformation regarding climate science 
Wyer & Budesheimcf 1987 1 69 Misleading information about a person 
Wyer & Budesheimc 1987 2 69 Misleading information about a person 
Wyer & Budesheimc 1987 3 69 Misleading information about a person 
Wyer & Unverzagtcef 1985 1 96 Misleading information about a person 
Note.  acredible misinformation; bcredible correction; csame source; dhigh-coherence 
misinformation; ehigh-coherence correction; fnegative misinformation; gnegative correction; huse 
negation; ipro-attitudinal correction; jcounter-attitudinal correction; lunpublished.    
 
 
 
 
 
CONTINUED INFLUENCE OF MISINFORMATION  33 
 
Table 2.  Summary of Hypotheses, Variables and Findings 
Theory and H# Variable Misinformation Correction Interaction 
H1-2: Mental models  
 
Coherence n.s. supported supported 
 Time delay 
 
 
 supported  
H3: Fluency Repetition 
 
supported n.s.  
Repetition of misinformation 
in correction 
 
 n.s.  
     
H4-H5: Worldview consistent 
elaboration  
Consistency with preexisting 
attitudes 
 
* supported  
Topic constructed/real 
 
           n.s. 
H6-H7: Source evaluation Credibility 
 
supported n.s.  
Equivalence  
 
supported 
H8: Negativity bias Negativity n.s. n.s. 
 
 
H9: Retrieval failure  Linguistic negation 
 
 n.s.  
Note.  * Impossible to compute due to multicollinearity or unavailability of studies. 
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Figure 1. PRISMA flow diagram showing the study screening process  
Records identified through database 
searching 
(n = 1,432) 
Records after duplicates 
removed 
(n = 920) 
Records excluded on the 
basis of title or abstract 
(n = 228) 
Full-text articles assessed for 
eligibility 
(n = 692) 
Full-text articles excluded: 
1)Irrelevant design (n = 547) 
2)No relevant outcome (n = 95) 
3)No neutral control (n = 29) 
4)Review paper (n = 8) 
                     
(n = 679) 
Additional reports 
obtained from reference 
lists 
(n = 38) 
Emailed 12 authors  
7 published papers 
3 unpublished papers 
(n = 10) 
Full-text articles excluded: 
1)Irrelevant design (n = 18) 
2)No relevant outcome (n = 11) 
3)Review paper (n = 3) 
 
                       (n = 32) 
Full-text articles excluded: 
1)Irrelevant design (n = 5) 
2)No neutral control (n = 3) 
 
                       (n = 8) 
Studies included in 
quantitative synthesis  
(n = 21, k = 32) 
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Figure 2.  The continued influence effect by coherence of misinformation (high/low) and 
coherence of correction (high/low) 
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